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IN THE SUPREME COURT 




.\LBEHTSON'S, a Corporation 




STATEl\fENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries arising out 
of a fall due to a slippery substance on the floor of one 
of the Albertson's supermarkets in Salt Lake City, in 
which the plaintiff suffered injury to her back, requiring 
two operations. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This ea~e was tried to a jury. The court submitted 
a sperial verdirt to the jury in the form of five questions 
and upon the basis of answers given to the special ver-
dirt. the court ordered the clerk to enter judgment, no 
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cause of action, which was accordingly done. Plaintiff 
made motion for new trial which was thereafter denied, 
from which plaintiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-appellant seeks reversal of the judgment in 
the court below and a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal is based exclusively upon the conduct 
of the court after the case had been submitted to the jury; 
however, it will be helpful to this court for a summary to 
be made of the evidence pertaining to the negligence 
of the defendant, particularly with respect to the error 
of the court in unduly emphasizing a portion of the di-
rect testimony of one of the defendant's witnesses. 
Throughout this brief the appellant will be referred to 
as the plaintiff and the respondent will be referred to as 
the defendant. 
Plaintiff, accompanied by her brother, Lon W. Rigby, 
went to the Albertson store on North Temple July 8, 
1962, at about 6:30 p.m., to buy groceries. (R. 94) As 
she was entering the aisle of the produce department she 
slipped on a slippery substance and fell. (R. 97) 
''It was some sort of produce. It was a slicky or 
slick, slimy sort of a substance ... I took it to be 
either part of a tomato or some grapes or some-
thing of that type produce.'' 
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This substance was intermingled with grime and. dirt. 
(R. 99) The witness, Verneta Cornia, further described 
the substance as 
'' ... a slick, slimy substance with an accumula-
tion of dirt over it." (. 178) 
The witness Lon W. Rigby testified that he had paid 
particular attention to the condition of the floor of the 
~ton•, and had particularly noticed that it was rather 
dirty, PVell at the front near the checking stands. (R. 187) 
He described the substance the plaintiff slipped on as 
follows: 
'''Veil, I would describe it as very dirty, slimy 
substance that occurred from falling objects and 
falling produce and that had been on it some 
time and that - and it was mingled in with a lot 
of dirt and grime and things from the slimy pro-
duce and things that was there, and I noticed 
that generally around the whole thing, and then 
there was also an area which appeared- I could 
s<'e below where they had also been mopping and 
some of - appeared to me that actually some of 
the water hadn't reached that area, but as one 
had stepped on it, it could have been some of the 
water left tracked up to that area mingled in with 
that debris and things that had been on the floor." 
(R. 189) 
The problem on the floor did not appear to be just 
due to a single item of a cherry or a piece of tomato. (R. 
189) He could not identify the type of vegetable or fruit 
involved because of the dirt which was mingled in with 
the substance and other things around that particular 
area. The slimy, slippery dirty condition of the store was 
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not confiined to the point where plaintiff fell. The wit-
ness definitely observed that throughout the store the 
floor was about as dirty as any chain store he had ever 
been in up to that time. (R. 190) The witness testified 
that a person working at the checking stand could have 
seen the floor area where plaintiff fell, as she fell right 
close to one of the checking stands. (R. 196) 
Ronald P. Sartori, a former employee of the defend-
ant, testified that the floor had been swept about 20 min-
utes to half an hour before plaintiff fell. (This certainly 
gave store employees an opportunity to observe the 
condition of the floor at that time and indicates a negli-
gent sweeping.) (R. 211) It was the policy of the store 
to clean up any accumulations of dirt or filth to keep 
the store clean at all times. (R. 213) 
As a stock clerk, the witness Sartori would be in the 
aisle several times during the course of the day and 
would be in a position to observe whether the aisles were 
clean or dirty. (R. 216) There are certain items of grime 
and dirt that get onto supermaarket floors that do not 
come up with a broom and quite a bit of spot mopping 
has to be done, especially at the close of the day. (R. 
217) There were areas around the produce department 
that needed to be spot mopped. (R. 218) 
The witness Andreason was the store employee who 
designated Mr. Coburn to do the sweeping and mopping. 
Regardless of the numerous trips he made through the 
store on inspection, he did not request any spot mopping 
or brooming prior to the time they were a bout ready 
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t u close t lu~ store. When the need existed, spot mopping 
wns not left to the end of the business day. (R. 233) The 
wit npss acknowledged that sometimes objects get stepped 
on before they are picked up and they get intermingled 
with the g-rime that might be on the floor and the dust 
whi('h makes a rather slippery dangerous floor. He 
('Ould not say that any spot mopping was done in the 
Yieinity of thr vegetable counter or the fruit display 
until ahout closing time. (R. 234) There were several 
areas in the store that needed spot mopping when he 
told l\f r. Co burn to do it, but he doesn't know at what 
time of day they first needed to be spot mopped. (R. 235) 
The witness, Timothy D. Coburn, testified that he 
was employed by Albertson's in July of 1962. (R. 220) 
That he was down at the end of the produce aisle mop-
ping at the time Mrs. Cornia fell. He had previously 
Hwept the whole floor. He stated: 
'''"ell, the produce aisle has to be thoroughly 
swept because there is a ledge underneath the pro-
duce aisle where the lettuce and that are kept, 
where they can be wet down, and you have to par-
ticularly get under there because something can 
roll under there that you can't see, and you have 
to make sure it is clean because the produce are 
slippery.'' (R. 221) 
Coburn was asked by the witness Ronald Sartori to 
mop up a mess and he observed what looked like a cherry. 
There was a pit and a maroon skid mark. The skid mark 
was about nine to twelve inches. Coburn cleaned up 
the mess and went back to work. There was no water on 
the floor at that point. He did not notice any produce 
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or other items on the floor in this area. Coburn's assign-
ment was to make sure that the floor was clean and spot 
mop it where it needed to be mopped. He had swept the 
aisle where Mrs. Cornia fell about twenty to thirty 
minutes prior to the time she fell. (R. 222) 
After the matter had been submitted to the jury and 
they had retired for their deliberations, they were called 
into court. At the request of the juror Pearce the court 
ordered the reporter to read the direct testimony of the 
witness Coburn down to the point where he mentioned 
sweeping the aisle where Mrs. Cornia fell about twenty 
to thirty minutes prior to the time she fell. (R. 254 -
R. 258) 
The cross examination of the witness Coburn was 
not later read to the jury, but upon cross examination 
witness Coburn qualified his direct testimony by stating 
that there were areas around the produce counter in the 
vicinity of where Mrs. Cornia fell that needed to be spot 
mopped. After he had swept the floor down some twenty 
to thirty minutes earlier he intended to return with the 
mop and clean those areas up. There had been things 
on the floor that the cart had made marks in, intermin-
gled dirt and moisture and possibly from other produce 
that had fallen and been picked up or things of that 
nature. That all grocery stores in spots will be grimy, 
particularly around the produce department. (R. 224} 
The store is always dirtier towards the close of the day 
and this was a pretty busy store. (R. 225) He had been 
spot mopping for about fifteen minutes when the incident 
happened. He was almost through. (R. 226) 
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Some of the water gets intermingled with the dirt 
and the grime there and helps to create a problem re-
quiring spot mopping. The residue of whatever lettuce 
leaves or tomato or fruit or cherry or whatever it is 
that might have fallen on the floor becomes mingled with 
watPr and dirt and has to be spot mopped, but the witness 
rlnimed there was no water on the floor at that time. 
The produce manager freshened the vegetables on that 
day prior to 4:00 o'clock. (R. 227) 
Hon:ard L. Andreason testified that he was the third 
man or third manager of the store. (R. 229) He desig-
nated Mr. Coburn to sweep and mop the floor on the 
day of the accident. He did not recall requesting any 
sweeping or mopping prior to 6:00 o'clock on that day. 
Despite the numerous trips which he claimed to have 
made through the store on inspection, he required no 
spot mopping or brooming prior to the time they were 
ready to close. (R. 233) Customers going by a display 
of cherries or grapes knock them off the table onto the 
floor, sometimes these objects get stepped on before 
they are picked up and they get intermingled with the 
grime that might be on the floor and it makes rather 
a slippery, dangerous floor. Does not recall whether 
any spot mopping was done in the vicinity of the vege-
table counter or fruit display until just about closing 
time. (R. 23) There were several areas in the store that 
needed spot mopping when Mr. Coburn was told to do it, 
but the witness did not know what time of day they first 
needed to be spot mopped. At any rate, the spot mopping 
was not assigned until about 6:00 o'clock so that there 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
may have been areas in the store at 2:00 o'clock in the 
afternoon that should have been spot mopped. (R. 235) 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the defendant made 
a motion for dismissal, claiming failure on the part of 
the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case and the court 
ruled that it was a jury question and denied the motion. 
(R. 240) 
The jury were recessed from the court room at 4 :21 
p.m. to retire to the jury room and at 6 :31 p.m. the court 
called them back to inquire as to the status of their de-
liberations and appetite. He asked the jurors if they 
had answered some of the questions and was informed 
by the foreman that they had. The court requested that 
the sheriff pass the incompleted special verdict up to 
him for examination, and was told by the foreman that 
the verdict had not been signed, whereupon the court 
said: 
''THE CouRT: You don't have to sign. If you 
have got an answer - you won't need to mark it. 
Let me take a little view of how we are going. 
''MR. 0AKSON: We have done more than we 
show here, Your Honor. 
''THE CouRT: Well, maybe if you would show 
what you (R. 249) have now done and let me see, 
it might be that we could save some time in this. 
"MR. 0AKSON: Can I tell you what-
'' THE CouRT : No, don't tell me yet. I don't 
want these fellows to know. I am leaguing up with 
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"\I R. O.u<sox: Sure. 'Ve are down to one ques-
tion. 
"THE ( 1oFitT: Okeh. You do what you can, 
and t ht•n ld me take a look at it. Now, for the two 
nnHwers that an' here, would more than six jurors 
sign that? 
"~In. 0.\ Ksox: Six, yes, sir, or more. 
"THE CouRT: Well, let's have six sign that, 
and then I believe I will have some help for you . 
. .\11(1 if six or more have signed each one, would 
yon sign at the end thereof as foreman too, Mr. 
Oakson. 
"~~ n. 0AKSON: All right, sir. On each individ-
ual question? 
''THE CouRT: The answers are as follows, and 
I will let counsel know and ask you to show by 
the raising of your hand if you have agreed with 
this answer: 'Did the plaintiff receive any injury 
as a result of any slip or fall which she (R. 250) 
sustained in the defendant's store~' The answer 
is 'Yes.' 
•' Those jurors who agreed and signed that 
answer please raise your hands. That is six hands 
np. The ones disagreeing with that would be Mr. 
Jordan and :Mr. Lewis, yes. 
''Question 2, 'Did any employee of the defend-
ant place any slick or slimy substance upon the 
floor which caused the plaintiff to slip or fall~' 
The answer is 'No.' 
"That is signed by all eight jurors. If you 
agree with this answer, show your hand. That's 
all hands. 
"Question - there are only five that signed 
question 3. Is there somebody else that signed-
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five can't find that. Is there somebody who didn't 
sign No. 3? 
''MR. U NDERwoon: That is the one we are held 
up on. 
''MR. LEWIS: That is the one we are held up 
on. 
"THE CouRT: I see. So we have no answer 
to 3. 
"MR. 0AKSON: That's right. 
"THE CouRT : Oh. Well, I can't help you. If 
the answer - if 3 had been answered, I could 
have saved a little time. So there really isn't an 
answer to 3 yet. So my - I was going by the an-
swer, assuming that six had agreed. I was in error 
about that, and I would have to let you debate 
further on 3.'' (R. 251) 
After informing the jury that he would send them 
out to dinner the court stated that if they had answered 
the first 4 questions there could be a possibility that 
it would not matter whether they answered 5 or not, 
depending on how the first 4 were answered, so he would 
keep the partial verdict locked up until they returned 
from lunch. (R. 252) 
The juror Pearce told the court that he was deeply 
concerned a bout whether they were spot mopping the 
floor or whether it was a general mop. (R. 253) 
The juror Pearce asked that the testimony of the 
witness Coburn be read, whereupon the court directed 
the reporter to read the testimony of the witness Coburn. 
(R. 254) 
The reporter then proceeded to read from the di-
rect testimony only of the witness Coburn pertaining to 
10 
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the swePping and mopping of the store and to the dis-
rovcry of the substance which looked like a cherry in 
the area where the plaintiff slipped. The witness also 
tt·stificd to having swept the floor and having made sure 
that it was clean and that the floor was dry and that he 
had swPpt the aisle about twenty to thirty minutes prior 
to the plaintiff's fall. (R. 255 to R. 258) 
Mr. Pearce stated that he had heard enough and 
none of the jurors indicated an interest upon hearing any 
more upon being questioned by the court. None of the 
cross-examination was read, which qualified considerably 
the tP~timony on direct. Another juror, Mr. Cornelius, 
said to the court that it seemed to him that the crux of 
the matter in question 3 was time, to which the court 
agreed, but the juror stated that in his opinion time 
wasn't the crux of it and he wanted to know if he could 
properly abstain from voting on this. The court then en-
tered into a rather lengthy explanation of the duty of 
the store and as to what would constitute negligence on 
the defendant's part. (R. 258, R. 259) 
Thereafter the juror Oakson reacted to the coercive 
comments of the court, suggesting that they ought to go 
to eat and come back to give everybody a chance, to which 
the court acquiesced. (R. 260) The coercive effect of the 
court's participation in the juror' deliberations in the 
courtroom was also felt by the juror Lewis who asked 
permission to make the following statement: 
"MR. LEWIS: I think that on something like 
this, I don't think for all the parties involved there 
should be any trying to rush this idea of getting 
11 
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home. Goodness only kno"Ts I ha Yc to go to the 
office, and I will be working tonight, and I am sure 
the rest of them will, but if we go in there for ten 
minutes, I know it is going to be in my opinion, 
just going to be a matter of trying to get a deci-
sion, and I think in fairness to both parties that 
it should be decided on a. level of not rushing 
and taking the time. 
''MR. PEARCE: Right. 
''MR. JORDAN : Right. 
"THE CouRT: You get that anyway. If you 
bring your verdict in, the sheriff will take you. 
''MR. LEwis : The thing I am getting at is if we 
try to go in on ten minutes, I don't think it is a 
fair verdict.'' (R. 261) 
After the jury had been released to go to dinner 
and while they were continuing their deliberations, coun-
sel for the plaintiff made the following statement into 
the record: 
"MR. WHITE: Comes now the plaintiff and ex-
cepts to the proceedings interrupting the delibera-
tions of the jury wherein the jury were called back 
into the courtroom, and during the course of in-
quiry as to whether they wanted to continue their 
deliberations or go to lunch, the court inquired 
as to the stage of the deliberations, and in the 
course of such inquiry suggested that the special 
verdict which had been handed to them for find: 
ing be shown to him with the view that he might 
assist in their deliberations, and that the verdict 
was in fact shown to him before it was arrived at, 
and discussion had been upon it and returned to 
the jury, and the jury deliberated on it in the 
courtroom and again returned to the court, and 
12 
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the court made ('(•mment on it, read part of the 
n•rd i(·t without reading all of it; and plaintiff ex-
<'Ppts to this entire proceeding as being against 
In w and irregular and interfering with the func-
tions of the jury to independently arrive at a ver-
(lict; that it prejudiced the negotiations for settle-
mPnt pending the deliberations of the jury; that it 
made an untimely revelation of the course of the 
deliberations which the jury's verdict was taking. 
"Further objects to the reading of the testi-
mony- the direct testimony of one witness at the 
request of one of the jurors to the jury. Excepts 
to the failure to read the cross examination on the 
ground that the portion read placed undue em-
phasis upon that part of the witness's testimony, 
and although it satisfied the juror that had made 
the inquiry concerning the matter, it may very 
well have operated to the prejudice of the plain-
tiff with respect to the other jurors who had not 
yet completed their deliberations; placed undue 
emphasis upon the direct examination of one wit-
ness only on a vital portion of the evidence about 
which there was other evidence elicited from other 
witnesses; and that the direct testimony was also 
modified by the cross examination, which was 
not read to the jury." (R. 262, R. 263) 
The plaintiff thereafter moved for a mistrial which 
the court denied. (R. 265) 
Thereafter the jury returned to the courtroom and 
g-an~ the court their special verdict in which 6 jurors 
agreed that the plaintiff had been injured by her fall in 
the defendant's store. All 8 jurors found that no em-
ployee of the store had placed any slick or slimy sub-
~tance on the floor, and answering question 3, 6 of the 8 
jurors found that the slick or slimy substance had not 
13 
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been upon the floor for such a length of time as \Yould 
have permitted employees of the defendant to have notirt) 
of it and remove it. Seven of the jurors agreed that the 
plaintiff was not contributorily negligent. (R. 266) 
The court thereupon indicated judgment in favor 
of the defendant, no cause of action. (R. 267) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
During the course of the jury's deliberations 
the trial cottrt erred to the prejudice of the 
plaintiff, in requiring the jurors to show him 
the special tterdict form before their delibera-
tions were completed; in requiring them to de-
liberate in open cou.rt in his presence and in the 
presence of the parties; in directing them to 
signify by raised hands how they 1uere voting; 
in directing them to sign their n.rvmrs to the 
questions on the special verdict in open court; 
a;nd in requiring them to make, through him, 
premature disclosure of their partially com-
pleted verdict. 
The extent of the trial court's interference with 
the deliberations of the jury in this case seems to be with-
out appellate court approved precedence in the history of 
trial by jury. We certainly respect the right of the trial 
rourt to recall the jury for the purpose of inquiring wheth-
er they were near a verdict or would like to go to dinner, 
hut we feel that the trial court should restrain his curios-
ity and not probe into the details of the jury's delibera-
tions to the point of requiring them to display to him 
14 
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a partially comp]('tetl special verdict form which led 
to his subsequent regrettable interference with the jury's 
fa('t-finding function. Rule 47 (L) provides that the offi-
cer in charge of the jury must not suffer any communica-
tion to be made to them, or make any himself, except to 
ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he 
must not, before the verdict is rendered, communicate 
to any person the state of their deliberations or the ver-
dict agreed upon. 
In Brasfield v. United States, 71 L. Ed. 345, appears 
the following : 
''The only errors assigned which are pressed 
upon us concern proceedings had upon recall of 
the jury after its retirement. The jury having 
failed to agree after some hours of deliberation, 
the trial judge inquired how it was divided nu-
merically and was informed by the foreman that 
it stood nine to three, without indicating which 
number favored a conviction. 
"We deem it essential to fair and impartial 
conduct of the trial that the inquiry itself should 
be regarded as ground for reversal. Such proced-
ure serves no useful purpose that cannot be at-
tained by questions not requiring the jury to re-
veal the nature or extent of its division. Its effect 
upon a divided jury will often depend on circum-
stances which cannot properly be known to the 
trial judge or to the appellate courts and may 
vary widely in different situations, but in general 
its tendency is coercive. It can rarely be resorted 
to without bringing to bear in some degree, se-
rious although not measurable, an improper in-
fluence on the jury, from whose deliberations 
eYery consideration other than that of the evi-
15 
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dence and the law as expressed in a proper charge, 
should be excluded. Such a practice, which is never 
useful and is generally harmful, is not to be 
sanctioned. 
"The failure of appellant's counsel to particu-
larize an exception to the court's inquiry does not 
preclude this court from correcting the error ... 
This is especially the case where the error, as 
here, affects the proper relations of the court to 
the jury, and cannot be sufficiently remedied by 
modification of the judge's charge after the harm 
has been done. It is unnecessary to consider other 
assignments of error directed to the instructions 
given to the jury at the time of its recall.'' 
In Kelsey Y. United States, 47 F. 2<1 453, the court 
said: 
''Because of the imputations of stubborn or 
worse which is likely to arise if the numerical di-
vision of the jury is publicly revealed, to require 
disclosure of it is held error per se in the courts of 
the United States, Brasfield Y. U. s., 272 rs 448, 
71 L. Ed 345.'' 
Although the court while speaking may not have been 
aware of it, the jury and counsel ·while listening felt that 
the court was actually participating in the factual de-
liberations of the jury and the court's attempt to expe-
dite those deliberations must haYe had some roereiYc 
influence upon the sixth juror Yd1o ultimately joined the 
other five in signing his name to interrogatory X o. 3. He 
had witnessed, as had \H', the jurors who had signed the 
questions while in the jtu~T-hox in open court so that it 
was apparent to him, as it was to us, which jurors were 
not concurring in that most important deliberation at that 
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point. This, in effect, was not only a numerical disclosure 
of how the jurors stood, but it was an identification of 
tho~l' who had not yet concurred. It is also reasonable 
to assume that the jurors who had indicated concurrence 
with the special interrogatories by raising their hands 
in open ('Ourt, as well as by signing the special verdict, 
would feel reluctant to change their mind or their vote, 
whereas otherwise in the deliberations which followed 
they might have found it desirable or proper to do so. 
"' e suppose that this is one of the fundamental reasons 
that juries a.re instructed not to prematurely make up 
their minds before their deliberations in the jury room 
are concluded. 
The jurors who had signed their names to the ques-
tions on the special verdict during their interrupted de-
liberations in the courtroom may very well have believed 
that it would not be permissible or proper for them to 
scratch out their names on the verdict form or in any 
manner change their position, that having once formally 
indicated their position they were precluded from amend-
ing or changing it. It would seem rather contradictory 
for the court to take pains in admonishing the jury to 
withhold their judgment until final submission of the 
matter to them and then during their deliberations place 
them in a situation where their expression of judgment 
is prematurely requested. Certainly the jurors who had 
already indicated how they stood in open court would 
not want the judge or the parties to think that they would 
vacillate or change their position, and this would render 
further deliberations nugatory and unproductive as far 
17 
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as the modification of their expressed viewpoint was 
concerned. 
An examination of the special verdict discloses that 
there was no change in the alignment of the jury and that 
the signatures placed on the special verdict in open court 
prior to the completion of the jury's deliberations were 
not disturbed or altered and this, despite the fact that 
the jury deliberated for approximately two hours after 
their return from dinner. Thus plaintiff's fear of judicial 
coercion eventuated into fulfillment. 
The court, himself, had examined the partial verdict 
and noted the names of the five who had signed it and 
this very examination had occurred in the presence of the 
whole jury. This is a much stronger factual situation 
for a new trial than the federal cases just cited where 
only the numerical division of the jury was the matter 
about which inquiry had been made. 
This coercive impact is evident from the statement of 
the juror Lewis who did not like the atmosphere which 
had been created and who felt that they should not try 
to rush their deliberations with the view to getting home 
and who stated that he felt, in fairness to both parties, 
the matter should be decided on a level of not rushing and 
taking the time, and the foreman, Mr. Oakson, said that 
he thought the jury ought to go to eat and come back. 
Of course, the court acquiesced in this desire expressed 
by the jury, but the harm had already been done. 
l\ioreover, it is always the policy of the court to en-
courage and favor the matter of settlement. N otwith-
18 
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standing the affidavit of the attorney for the defendant, 
there had be('n settlement discussion during the jury's 
deliberations in which counsel for the defendant had 
stated that he only had $3,500.00 authority and counsel 
for the plaintiff had indicated a willingness to accept 
$6,000.00. The premature disclosure of the jury's de-
liberations completely destroyed any settlement possi-
bility, in that it was apparent to both parties that five 
of the jurors had indicated an answer resolving the issue 
in favor of the defendant because the court had made it 
('lear in his comment that having answered the first three 
questions, it was unnecessary for them to consider ques-
tion No. 4 which was the question regarding damages. 
We do not think that it is part of the function of the 
trial judge to participate in the deliberations of the jury 
after the matter has been submitted to them under a thor-
ough and proper charge, and we earnestly submit that 
the effect of the proceedings after the recall of the jury 
was to create an improper interference with the jury's 
function to the prejudice of the plaintiff, for which a 
new trial should have been granted. 
In the recent case of State of Utah v. Martinez, 7 U. 
2d, 387, 326, Pac. 2d 102, :Mr. Justice Henriod in revers-
ing the trial court for permitting jurors to ask questions 
of a witness after they had retired to deliberate, took 
note of the fact that counsel are placed in an embarras-
sing position where they are reluctant to invoke the dis-
pleasure of the jury by making objections under such cir-
cumstances. After the juror Pearce had made a re-
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quest for the reading of the testimony of the witness 
Coburn at the time the jury was recalled, it may have 
prejudiced the plaintiff's position to object to the juror's 
request or to request the cross-examination to be read 
after the juror had indicated he was satisfied with what 
had been read. The court was in a much better position 
to explain to the juror why his initial request should be 
denied, and having erred in granting it, the trial court 
could have made some effort to have the court reporter 
read other evidence to the jury, and at least the cross-
examination of the witness Coburn. The court was given 
a further opportunity to correct or minimize the impact 
of his error when the plaintiff moved for a mistrial, call-
ing his attention to the failure to read the cross-exami-
nation of the witness and other evidence which substan-
tially modified or opposed the direct testimony which had 
been read. 
POINT 2. 
The cou,rt erred to the prejudice of the plaintiff 
in. directin.g the court reporter to read part of 
the direct testimon.y of the witness Coburn. 
The court allowed the reading of part of the testi-
mony of the witness Timothy W. Coburn at the request 
of one of the jurors and although the court cautioned that 
by reading it it was not intended that extra emphasis be 
given to his testimony, that was nevertheless the ines-
capable result. His testimony related to the very prob-
lem that the jury was encountering in answering inter-
rogatory No. 3 which at that point had not been resolved 
hy a sufficient number of jurors to establish a verdict. 
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The reading of a portion of the tP~timony of one witness 
to the jury aftt.•r the matter had been submitted to them 
was held reversible error in the Utah case of Jeuki,ns Y. 
Sftphe11s, fi-t. ll. 307, 231 Pac. 112, from which we quote 
as follows: 
'' ... ~lr. Skeen was an important witness, tes-
tifying in rebuttal after the defendant had closed 
her case. It was, therefore, doubly important that 
if this witness' testimony was to be selected and 
read separate from all other testimony bearing 
on that particular question, his entire testimony 
should have been read to the jury, notwithstand-
ing the jury expressed themselves as satisfied 
with what had been read. 
"The Court of Appeals of Colorado in Her-
sey v. Tully, 8 Colo. App. 110, 44 Pac. 855, in con-
sidering the action of the trial court in permitting 
certain testimony to be read to the jury after the 
case had been submitted said: 'But without re-
gard to any question of legal effect of this testi-
mony, it was serious error to permit it to be read 
to the jury after the case had been submitted to 
them. They thus heard a portion of the plaintiff's 
testimony twice and the last time disconnected 
from all the other evidence, so that they went back 
to their room with their memories refreshed as 
to this; and having listened to it out of its connec-
tion, they would be liable to give it an importance 
to which it was not entitled and which they would 
not have given it otherwise.' 
''Courts generally do not favor permitting any 
one witness' testimony on a particular question, 
whether there is other testimony on the record 
bearing on the same question, to be read to the 
jury after a case has been submitted .... 
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''We need not determine whether the giving 
of the instruction and the reading of the testi-
mony in the absence of counsel would of itself con-
stitute reversible error in the absence of some 
showing that prejudice resulted by permitting or 
causing to be read to the jury the direct testimony 
of a witness without having the cross examination 
read, and in giving of an instruction which is in 
conflict with former instructions, are such error 
that in our opinion must of necessity result in a 
reversal of the judgment and a granting of a new 
trial.'' 
The above case was cited with approval in Justice 
Wolfe's concurring opinion in Stale v. Peterson, 110 U. 
413, 17 4 Pac. 2d 843. 
On the cross-examination the witness Coburn quali-
fied his direct testimony which alone was read to the jury, 
by admitting that there were areas around the produce 
counter where :Mrs. Cornia fell that needed to be spot 
mopped; that after he had swept the floor down some 
twenty to thirty minutes earlier he intended to return 
with the mop and clean those areas up; that there had 
been previous things on the floor that the cart had made 
marks in, intermingled dirt and moisture and possibly 
from other produce that had fallen or things of that na-
ture. ( R. 224) Further on cross-examination Co burn tes-
tified that the produce manager freshened the vegetables 
on that day prior to four o'clock. 
In further conflict with the portion of the witness 
Coburn's testimony which was read to the jury in which 
he asserted that the plaintiff had apparently slipped upon 
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n rherry, was the testimo11y of the plaintiff who testified 
that the slippery substance upon which she fell was a 
slimy sort of substance which she took to be either part 
of a tomato or some grapes or something of that type 
whirh had been intermingled with grime and dirt. (R. 
H9) The witness Rigby stated that the problem on the 
floor where plaintiff fell did not appear to be just due to 
a single item of a cherry or a piece of tomato. (R. 189) 
He also stated that the slimy dirty condition of the store 
\ras not confined to the point where the plaintiff fell. 
That he could not identify the type of vegetable or fruit 
involved because of the dirt which was intermingled with 
it. (R. 190) The witness Sartori had testified that he had 
been in the aisle in question several times during the 
course of the day, .(R. 216) and that there were areas 
around the produce department that needed to be spot 
mopped. (R. 218) 
The witness Andreason testified that regardless of 
the numerous trips he had made through the store on in-
spection, he did not request any spot mopping or broom-
ing prior to closing time and he acknowledged that there 
were several areas in the store that needed spot mopping 
when he told ~Ir. Coburn to do it and he did not know at 
what time of day they first needed to be spot mopped. 
(R. ~35) 
It was apparent during the postsubmission proced-
ure in which the court directed, guided and participated 
in the jury's deliberations, that question No. 3 was the 
one which presented the most difficult problem to the jury 
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- the matter upon which they ·were then, despite tlH' 
court's interference, unable to agree. This emphasizes 
the prejudicial impact of the court's reading a portion of 
the witness Coburn's testimony in which he claimed to 
have swept the store just twenty minutes prior to plain-
tiff's fall and that the plaintiff had apparently slipped 
upon a cherry which had subsequently been dropped on 
the floor in some unknown manner. Certainly it is fair 
to say that the jury having listened to such testimony out 
of its connection with the case and sans its subsequent 
modification by the witness himself would be likely to 
give to it an importance to which it was not entitled and 
which would not have been given it otherwise. 
This probability was directly called to the trial 
court's attention by counsel for the plaintiff '"ho excepted 
to the court's failure to read the cross-examination on 
the ground that the portion read placed undue emphasis 
upon that part of the witness's testimony, and it placed 
undue emphasis upon a vital portion of the evidence about 
which there was no other evidence elicited from other 
witnesses. 
POINT 3. 
The trial court erred in denying plaintiff's mo-
tion, for mistrial and in denying plaiutiff subse-
quent motion for a new trial. 
For the reason set forth in the argument under 
Points 1 and 2, plaintiff was deprived of a fair trial, and 
the court erred in denying plaintiff's motion for a mis-
trial and for a new trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the various reasons discussed in this brief, and 
for any other reasons which may occur to this court 
through careful consideration of this appeal, plaintiff 
.. ariiPstly contends that the judgment of the lower court 
should be reversed and plaintiff, in the furtherance of 
justice, should be granted a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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